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16th CONGRESS OF THE WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL 
Summary 
GLOBAL ENERGY PERSPECTIVES TO 2050 AND BEYOND 
NakiCenoviC N., International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Austria 
Jefferson J.M., World Energy Council 
Summarized here are the key findings on global energy-related issues presented in the joint 
WEC and IIASA Report Global Energy Perspectives to 2050 and Beyond. The Report is 
based on an evaluation of six scenarios. 
The world's energy use will rise in the coming decades because of population growth, 
economic and social development, and increasing demand for the services which energy 
provides. To meet the growing demand for energy services commercial energy provision will 
expand, with both a continuing reliance on fossil fuels and increasing non-fossil fuel supplies. 
These non-fossil fuel supplies will include a variety of renewable energy sources. Nuclear 
energy provision will also increase if challenges posed by public concerns with safety, costs 
and scale can be met. 
Electricity and other energy forms delivered through dedicated supply networks are likely to 
benefit from future developments, as part of a general emphasis on the delivery of energy 
services in convenient, flexible and clean forms. The pace of development in the various 
sectors of final energy use between OECD, transitional and developing economies will differ. 
Greater emphasis will be placed on residential and commercial needs in the first. In the latter 
the industry and transport sectors expand comparatively rapidly. There will be an increasing 
emphasis on efficiency improvements in conversion and end-uses of energy, and on satisfying 
consumer requirements. This shift requires changes in corporate focus and structure, and 
more rapid technology innovation and diffusion. 
These changes have costs and the financing of energy developments could prove problematic. 
Local and regional pollution and its mitigation, together with potential climate change, will 
also pose challenges and impose costs. Sulphur and nitrogen emissions are seen as 
particularly requiring abatement. The pressures of population growth and urbanisation are 
expected to impose their own severe challenges. These, and many of the other challenges 
covered in this Report, call for institutional changes. Given that many developments taking 
place occur in the now developing countries of the South, a significant eventual shift in the 
world's geopolitical balance towards the South is anticipated. 
For energy policy-makers and decision-makers the key finding is that, given the lead-times 
in infrastructural and other major capital investments, there is little divergence between the 
six different scenarios until after 2020. But action is required long before 2020 if desired 
development paths are not to be blocked and options foreclosed. This requires reconsideration 
of the traditional separation of energy supply and end-use investments. 
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1 Introduction 
The world's energy use will rise in the coming decades. This is because people desire the 
services which energy provides - such as heating and cooling, cooking and lighting, mobility, 
modern communications and information processing, and the motive power of machinery. 
In today's world huge numbers of people do not have access to the services provided only 
by modern energy forms. Nearly 2.5 billion people are without electricity. There are 600 
people for every car in China. Over 70% of Africa's population has no motive power other 
than human or animal muscle. In the coming decades the world's population will also grow. 
There are now some 5.8 billion people on Earth. By the year 2050 the total is expected to 
exceed 10 billion; and by the year 2100 to be in excess of 11.5 billion. They, too, will want 
the services provided by energy. 
This study addresses the prospects for improving the global availability of energy services, 
and the wider implications this may have. The anticipated rise in energy use, most of it 
coming from what are now termed the developing countries or "the South", requires the 
greater harnessing of existing resources and the accessing of new resources. It also requires 
considering the options available, over realistic time frames and at affordable costs, bearing 
in mind the wide variability of resource endowments between countries - and of income and 
wealth between individuals and between countries. 
This paper provides a summary of the main findings of a Report on "Global Energy 
Perspectives to 2050 and Beyond", prepared jointly by the World Energy Council (WEC) and 
the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). The main time-horizon of 
the study is to 2050, thereby extending in time and detail the main focus of the WEC 
Commission's study: "Energy for Tomorrow's World", first published in 1993. The WEC 
Commission's main focus was out to the year 2020, but some elements were considered in 
outline to the year 2100. The year 2100 is the main time-horizon for several major issues and 
the organisations examining them, particularly potential climate change associated with 
greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel use and other human activities. 
The present study considers the post-2020 period in greater depth and detail than the WEC 
Commission did, using alternative sets of assumptions about future possibilities. These 
different sets of assumptions are descriptions of alternative possible futures - termed 
scenarios. They are not predictions of what will happen. The possibilities considered include 
different rates of economic growth, changes in energy productivity (or intensity), primary 
energy demand, the volume of fossil fuels that can be realistically exploited, renewable and 
nuclear energy possibilities, technology dynamics and costs, the availability of finance, 
institutional developments and policy responses. Six scenarios have been developed for this 
study. The key features of these scenarios, and their quantification, are outlined in the 
Technical Annex to this paper. 
For this Paper we concentrate on the main findings and implications of the study. Readers 
wishing to examine the study findings, scenario methodology, quantification and outcomes 
in detail are referred to the full WECIIIASA Report "Global Energy Perspectives to 2050 and 
Beyond". This subject will also be revisited after 1995, starting from the position of (and 
prospects for) eleven world regions. This will allow the results of the present top-down 
examination to be tested and checked against an evaluation which will be completed as a 
regional or bottom-up exercise. Local realities, perceptions and aspirations can then be more 
closely integrated, as was achieved by the WEC Commission: "Energy for Tomorrow's 
World". 
There is one general point about the six scenarios which needs to be emphasised at the outset. 
They are all regarded as viable. But none assume that developments can be taken for granted. 
All assume, to varying degrees, that domestic and international policies will promote the free 
exchange of goods and technology or overcome the restrictions which regional bloc formation 
may impose from time to time. All assume an adequate investment climate, and a supply of 
labour with the necessary skills to diffuse and maintain the technologies required. All assume 
that fossil fuels to the extent required, or non-fossil fuels to the volumes desired, will become 
available to sustain the development path of each scenario. These are the necessary 
foundations for the productivity increases of labour and capital needed to realise the economic 
growth assumed for all the scenarios. The various assumptions are not independent of each 
other, but taken together result in consistent scenarios. Internal consistency has been tested 
by the use of formal models. 
There is a risk that temporary bottlenecks could emerge in the energy sector. It will have to 
compete successfully for much needed investment from a multitude of economic and 
development concerns. It is possible to conceive of financial requirements becoming 
unmanageable, or of local pollution reaching unacceptable proportions (the latter particularly 
through failure to ensure coal-fired electricity generating plants are fitted with scrubbers, 
and/or because of failure to tackle vehicle emissions). In the event of such adverse 
developments the scenario paths described may not be achieved. In all the scenarios 
developed here it is assumed that sufficiently effective responses to the key challenges have 
been forthcoming. 
2 The Main Findings 
2.1 Energy Supply and Use 
2.1.1 Energy Use Grows 
The world's primary energy use will rise markedly. In the absence of widespread, determined 
and effective steps to curtail demand growth - by dramatic efficiency improvements, 
technological developments and because of environmental concerns - primary energy demand 
is likely to expand 2 to 2.5-fold by 2050; and by 3.5 to 4.5-fold by 2100. Scenarios driven 
by ecological concerns and effective policy responses seem likely to produce significantly 
lower trajectories, as indicated by the ecologically driven scenarios in this study. 
2.1.2 Commercial Energy Provision Expands 
To provide the greater volumes of energy required, in the forms desired, it is commercial 
provision which will expand: electricity and natural gas through interconnected systems 
which make energy readily available at point of use; liquid fuels; and an increasing variety 
of fuels for heat and power provision from non-fossil sources that become technically and 
economically feasible if appropriate research, development and technological innovation take 
place. 
In many developing countries there is still heavy dependence on traditional fuels - fuelwood, 
crop wastes, animal dung - that are consumed locally and without any conversion. It is 
neither practicable nor desirable to anticipate larger volumes of energy coming from 
traditional sources to meet future requirements if they continue to be provided in non- 
sustainable ways. Even the present 10 to 15% of world primary energy supply coming from 
traditional fuels is unsustainable over large areas - in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and 
in the AsialPacific Region. 
2.1.3 Continuing Reliance on Fossil Fuels 
Commercial fossil fuels now supply over 75% of the world's primary energy. This study 
confirms the availability of large volumes of fossil fuel resources which should be 
economically and technically viable to exploit over the coming decades. In comparison to 
the estimated ultimately recoverable volume of coal resources, the world since the earliest 
times has used just over 4% of the amount available. For oil, the corresponding figure is 
about 13.5% (assuming substantial volumes of unconventional oil are also ultimately 
recoverable). For natural gas the corresponding figure is about 6%. The issue is not whether 
geological resources are constrained (although in the long term to 2100 the finite nature of 
the fossil fuel resource base would inevitably become evident). The real issue is whether 
because of lack of technological development, great distances from markets, financial 
constraints, environmental considerations (local, regional and global), and the eventual 
availability of more attractive and viable alternatives, substantial fossil fuel resources will be 
left unexploited. This study therefore provides alternative estimates of cumulative resource 
consumption for the six scenarios to reflect the differing extent to which the fossil resource 
base may be exploited. 
In the period to 2050 this study concludes from its six scenarios that, by comparison with 
usage from the earliest times to the present: 
- in the lowest coal scenario, the same amount of coal would be used again; 
- in the highest coal scenario, 2.5 times the coal would be used; 
- in the lowest oil scenario, twice the volume of oil would be used; 
- in the highest oil scenario three times the volume of oil would be used; 
- in the lowest natural gas scenario four times the volume would be used; 
- in the highest natural gas scenario nearly six times the volume would be used. 
The implications for various energy industries and for regional fuel producers are given in 
more detail in the full report "Global Energy Perspectives to 2050 and Beyond1'. 
Natural gas is accorded great importance in all six scenarios, and varies least of the fossil 
fuels between the scenarios. Oil also continues to be important across the scenarios, 
reflecting the belief that transportation demand is likely to grow inexorably in many countries 
and that it will be difficult to introduce viable alternative fuels in sufficient quantities within 
the next four or five decades. With the rise in relative importance of natural gas, however, 
is expected to come a decoupling from oil. Natural Gas will be a fuel in its own right, with 
its own markets - including those where it has hitherto not competed effectively with oil. 
2.1.4 Expanding Non-Fossil Fuel Supplies 
The lead-times required to achieve massive changes in the world's fuel mix are many 
decades. The WEC Commission in "Energy for Tomorrow's World" stressed that this means 
action must start now if the process of change is to be instituted in the decades leading up 
to 2050. "Global Energy Perspectives to 2050 and Beyond" takes this theme further, pointing 
out the likelihood of diverging development paths and locking-out desirable options. 
References to long lead-times are therefore not to be interpreted as suggesting "do nothing". 
Realistic time-frames for change require recognition of the lead-times involved, as well as 
appropriate government, industry and consumer decision-taking. 
There are barriers to the expansion of renewable energy supplies which exist within the fossil 
fuel sector. These include the plentiful availability of fossil fuel resources, their generally low 
costs, and the huge existing investments in fossil fuel provision and use. Especially in 
developing and transitional economies there is also the widespread existence of subsidies to 
end-users, which encourages waste and inefficiency. The view that non-fossil fuels are unable 
to compete "on a level playing field" with fossil fuels due to failure to incorporate 
internalisation of all costs in prices is widely held; but costs and available technology have 
hitherto also been a major barrier. 
The present study examines the prospects for a diversified portfolio of new renewable forms 
of energy - particularly modern biomass and solar; and for nuclear power. Each of the 
scenarios makes somewhat different assumptions about the pace of expansion for renewable 
forms of energy; and more or less optimistic assessments of the prospects for nuclear power. 
Renewable energy developments will vary geographically in response to available resources 
and technologies, and to the level and structure of energy demand. The spread of new 
renewable technologies will be critically dependent upon learning and experimentation, and 
there is great uncertainty about how far policy interventions will be able to shortcut this 
process. 
Compared to a number of other published scenarios, this study concludes that growth of 
renewable energy supplies will be more gradual in the near to medium term. Total renewable 
energy supplies are expected to grow from 1.6 Gtoe (gigatonnes oil equivalent) in 1990 to 
between 2.3 Gtoe and 3.3 Gtoe in 2020. This more modest near-term growth is, however, 
counterbalanced by much higher growth rates in the long term. All scenarios show a 
substantial increase in renewables, but with a considerable variation in the percentage of total 
primary energy supplied by renewables. By 2050 renewables could account for between 16% 
and 30% in a High Economic Growth set of scenarios; and for between 35% and 40% in the 
Ecologically Driven Scenarios. 
These differences reflect the different driving forces the study expects to be at work. The 
overall pattern of development is broadly in line with previous WEC studies: "Energy for 
Tomorrow's World", 1993 and "New Renewable Energy Resources: A Guide to the Future", 
1994. However, a somewhat slower evolution under this study's middle course scenario is 
assumed than under the comparable scenarios in the two earlier WEC publications. This 
study reflected the possibility of a more gradual phaseout of traditional biomass and a smaller 
contribution of large hydropower than assumed in the WEC's earlier work. 
The study has also considered the long-term potential of modern biomass, and found that 
although additional land areas for both agriculture and biomass energy are available in 
principle, they would stretch future land requirements to their ultimate limits. By 2100 
agriculture (1,700 million hectares) and biomass (700 - 1,350 million hectares) could require 
as much land as is currently covered by forests. Land-use conflicts and ecosystems concerns 
are likely to prove a major constraint, particularly in high population density areas such as 
Asia. 
Perhaps the biggest difference between the fossil fuels and renewables is that the former can 
be regarded as a (large) stock; the latter by hugh annual or seasonal flows. For instance, the 
earth annually intercepts about 130,000 Gtoe of solar energy compared with 9 Gtoe total 
global energy consumption in 1990. But these huge renewable flows are dispersed and 
diffuse, and generally offer very low energy densities by comparison with the fossil fuels. 
Therefore, rather like the fossil fuels, modern renewables require elaborate systems of energy 
conversion, transport and distribution to make them useful. 
It is the conclusion of this study that by the year 2050 renewables could provide as little as 
16% of primary energy (Scenario Al)  or as much as 39% (Scenario Cl) ,  with volumes 
expanding at a steady pace in all scenarios. This study's middle course scenario assumes 
renewables provide 33% of global primary energy by the year 2100 or 1 1  Gtoe (which is 
more than total current world primary energy use). 
So far as the prospects for nuclear power are concerned, there is little difference across the 
scenarios in terms of installed capacity in the year 2020. Thereafter the paths diverge, with 
a range between a 5-fold increase 1990-2050 and almost no increase to 2050, followed by 
phasing out during the second-half of the next century in the latter scenario. One scenario 
envisages nuclear power in the long run emerging as a "swing" supplier but having adopted 
more sophisticated fuel cycles, advanced reactors, and smaller-scale processing units which 
gain general public confidence. 
The main barriers to nuclear power's expansion at the present time are public concerns with 
operational safety, waste disposal and proliferation, and high initial capital costs. Those 
scenarios in this study which assume vigorous development of nuclear energy require 70 GW, 
new capacity per year to 2050, including the required replacement of existing plants. This 
implies build-up rates up to ten times higher than the recent construction pace. This in turn 
would require new and convincingly safer reactor designs, a substantial decrease in 
construction costs and times, and in the longer run the standardisation and introduction of a 
series of small units. 
Nuclear power's contribution by the year 2050 could have risen to a figure in the 11% to 
14% range, or could be lagging in the 4% to 6% range. Thereafter, if the necessary positive 
responses are made to public concerns and technological and financial requirements then 
nuclear power's share in primary energy supply could rise to nearly 30%. If such positive 
responses are not forthcoming and effective then a virtual moratorium could emerge. Thus 
nuclear has the most divergent prospects of all energy sources. 
Nuclear power expansion in the long-term future will require either breeder reactors or a 
combination of new developments in fuel cycles, conversion rates, and the recovery of low- 
grade uranium widely occurring in the earth's crust and oceans. No assumptions have been 
made about nuclear fusion, or indeed other forms of "new" energy which may emerge but 
which do not exist today. For both renewables and nuclear the greatest expansion is expected 
to occur in the current developing countries. In this study's high nuclear contribution 
scenarios the developing countries would have an installed nuclear capacity about double the 
current global level, which is now located mostly in the OECD countries. 
2.1.5 Increasing Electricity Use 
The demand for easily accessible, clean energy forms will provide the basis for increasing 
electricity use. In the longer term hydrogen is also expected to perform an increasing role. 
In the period to 2020 the role of oil products in electricity generation will continue to decline, 
but the contribution of all other established fuels will increase. Renewable sources of energy 
and, in some scenarios, nuclear power play an increasing role. In all scenarios except one 
fossil fuels represent a declining share of electricity generation to 2020 and beyond. This 
indicates the wide supply diversification which will have taken place by 2050, provided the 
desirable options have been chosen and necessary technology path established before 2020. 
Thus policies and decisions taken in the next two decades with respect to research, 
development and demonstration will largely determine the economic effectiveness and 
environmental appropriateness of future electricity generating options. 
Important developments are expected to occur among those providing electricity. Their 
emphasis is likely to switch to the provision of energy services rather than just kilowatt hours, 
although this process is likely to begin later in transitional and developing economies. The 
number of independent producers is expected to increase. Production is likely to become 
more decentralized. And deregulation and common carrier rights will transform production, 
transmission and distribution into separate businesses. 
2.1.6 Expanded Use of Dedicated Supply Networks 
Developments in electricity distribution will be paralleled by some similar developments for 
natural gas, district heat, and eventually - post 2050 - probably for hydrogen. In particular, 
these energy forms will be delivered to an increasing degree by dedicated transport systems, 
such as pipelines and grids. This will enhance trade possibilities and promote similar end-use 
patterns across regions, even where fundamentally different primary energy supply structures 
exist. 
The main exception to this trend is expected to be locally appropriate and delivered renewable 
energy systems in rural areas (modern biomass, micro-hydro, solar photovoltaic, wind) and 
dedicated solar photovoltaic and biogas systems in urban residences. Some renewable 
developments, however, could be connnected to grids both as decentralised sources of energy 
and to obtain back-up from the grid. 
2.1.7 Further Emphasis on Convenient and Clearz Energy 
Less than a hundred years ago people in the industrialised nations still relied heavily on 
horses, draught animals more generally, and their own feet for mobility. Less than fifty years 
ago these people still handled and used coal and fuelwood directly in their homes for heating 
and cooking purposes. The rise of the motor vehicle, and of electric and gas appliances, have 
given immediate access in the industrialised countries to the energy service desired, freedom 
and choice have expanded, and what was initially a luxury for the few has become the norm 
for a majority. 
Over the next century, even in countries which today are characterised by most of the 
population being unable to access commercial energy (and unable to afford it if they 
technically could), huge changes can be expected. What is for many now out of grasp will 
have become a reality. Access to commercial energy will expand, and this will increasingly 
provide energy services in convenient, flexible and clean forms. This requirement will not 
only reflect greater economic prosperity and expectations, but should also lead to the 
mitigation of pollution which would otherwise occur as more and more people use greater 
amounts of energy in the current developing and rapidly industrialising countries. This 
development will most obviously be seen in a pervasive shift from energy used in its original 
form - such as traditional direct uses of biomass and coal - to elaborate systems of energy 
conversion and delivery, and to the ever-widening application of end-use devices which 
conform to customer requirements. After 2050 the likelihood is that direct uses of biomass 
and coal will have been phased out. 
2.1.8 Changes in Firzal Energy Demand 
Over the next few decades final energy use in the industrialised countries of the OECD is 
expected to show residential and commercial needs growing faster than those for industry and 
transport. With high levels of affluence and leisure, new services and new activities emerge 
that shift final energy requirements further away from traditional industrial production. 
In recent years in leading OECD countries demographic changes associated with ageing, 
increasing malelfemale cohabitation without children, and a rise in the number of single- 
person households have been reflecting this trend. The elderly are more mobile and 
prosperous than their predecessors. Younger couples and single adults are more mobile and 
even leisure activities are widely associated with commercial energy consumption. Families 
with children are also more mobile (whether out of choice or, in the context of taking children 
to and from school, out of perceived necessity), and both outdoor and indoor leisure pursuits 
are associated with a range of energy-using devices, including electronic equipment. 
These trends could well continue and spread in the industrialised countries, and extend over 
the next century to an increasing number of countries now engaged in the industrial 
development process. But for the next few decades final energy needs in the current 
developing countries are more likely to grow fastest in the industry and transport sectors, and 
comparatively slower in the residential and commercial sectors. Globally there is likely to 
be a shift - already discernible in some of the leading industrial nations - towards 
communication and services replacing some mobility and production. This process is 
expected to result in lower material and energy intensities. 
2.1.9 Introduction of New Energy- Using Devices 
Changes in the fuel mix, the expansion of commercial energy availability, the increased role 
of networks, the demand for convenient and clean energy services, and developments in final 
energy use could well all combine to promote new energy-using devices. There will be 
changes promoted by quality improvements in the fuel mix and conversion processes, which 
will in turn encourage efficiency gains. There is likely to be increasing consciousness of the 
scope for technological change in end-use devices (cars, lighting, cooking stoves, and space 
heating and cooling systems are the most obvious examples) to meet the ways in which final 
energy use is evolving. Technological change is also expected to occur in power plants and 
in industrial processes to meet emerging requirements of quality, efficiency and environmental 
acceptability. 
2.1.10 Energy Increasingly Service Driven and Consuiner Orientated 
In the past there was a tendency for the energy industry to be supply-orientated, focused on 
large-scale engineering excellence, and on volume. In the coming decades the stance is 
expected to change radically and rapidly. 
It is now widely recognised that consumers do not seek energy as such, but the services 
which energy provides. Suppliers of energy are therefore required to see themselves as 
providing easy, efficient and competitive cooking, lighting, heating and cooling, mobility and 
motive power, communications and information processing. Consumers will become 
increasingly demanding of high quality, efficient and relatively low cost energy services. 
They will be increasingly aware, and made aware, of the environmental impact of their energy 
use. They will provide increasing challenges to the providers of such services. Even in 
those developing countries where the lack of commercial energy availability is now the key 
issue, and this remains the most potent obstacle, these forces will become apparent and 
intensify over the next century. 
2.1.11 Energy Efficiency Increases 
There is a clear historic trend for overall energy efficiency to improve as countries 
industrialise. Energy intensities are lower at higher per capita Gross Domestic Product. More 
efficient energy conversion and end-use technologies become affordable at higher income 
levels, their costs fall and higher quality energy carriers are made available. These trends can 
be expected to extend to the economies in transition and to the current developing countries 
over the coming decades. 
Recently, however, energy intensity improvements in the OECD area have come to a standstill 
due to low energy prices since 1985 and widespread economic recession or sluggishness. In 
the economies in transition a drop in primary energy demand has been exceeded by a 
dramatic fall in economic output, with the result that energy intensities have risen 
significantly. Only in the developing countries have energy intensities fallen steadily in recent 
years. While their total primary energy demand has been rising at 2% per annum (3% per 
annum for commercial energy) their Gross Domestic Product in aggregate has been rising at 
4.8% per annum. Thus their aggregate energy intensities have fallen by nearly 3% per year 
(and commercial energy intensities by nearly 2% per year). 
In the light of these recent developments the present study adopts a more modest set of 
assumptions about the pace of future energy efficiency gains than did the WEC Commission 
in "Energy for Tomorrow's World", 1993. The world average for the period 1990-2050 in 
the present study is 1 .O% per annum reduction in the high economic growth scenarios; 0.8% 
per annum in the middle course scenario; and 1.4% per annum in the ecologically driven 
scenarios (the WEC Commission range 1990-20 for the world was 1.3-2.4% per annum). 
The energy intensities adopted here are a function of the internal consistency of the six 
scenarios - the relationship between economic growth, capital turnover, technological change 
and efficiency improvement. 
This downward adjustment in energy efficiency assumptions brings them more closely in line 
with long-term experience. The world may well be able to do better in future, especially if 
policy-makers directly and effectively address the issue of raising efficiency in both energy 
conversion and use. Energy users have little experience of such policies and what they could 
achieve. A number of conclusions concerning energy efficiency improvements are detailed 
in the full report "Global Energy Perspectives to 2050 and Beyond": 
the faster the growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita the faster is 
productivity growth, the rate of capital stock turnover therefore increases and 
energy intensities can be expected to improve more rapidly; 
where there is negative per capita GDP change energy intensities deteriorate (as 
recently demonstrated by the economies in transition); 
a region at a given level of per capita GDP can be assumed to achieve similar 
energy intensities or better (due to learning and general technological advance) 
as industrialised countries did at a similar per capita GDP level; 
there are significant variations between countries due to historical developments, 
culture and settlement patterns; 
there is a tendency for commercial energy intensity to rise, reach its maximum, 
and then decline. In a number of developing countries overall energy intensity 
(non-commercial and commercial energy combined) is in decline, but commercial 
energy intensity is rising; 
energy intensities are lower where the whole (or a larger proportion) of a 
country's economic activity is incorporated in the comparison than when only the 
formal economy quantified in national accounts is included. 
energy intensity improvements are generally lower using purchasing power parity 
as the basis for GDP rather than GDP at market exchange rates. 
2.2 Corporate, Technological and Financial Challenges 
2.2.1 Changing Corporate Structure and Focus 
All energy industries will see substantial growth to at least 2020, although in some more 
prosperous andlor environmentally sensitive countries specific sectors are likely to be on the 
defensive. There will nevertheless be much change within and between energy sectors. 
Many new business opportunities will arise linked to cleaner and more convenient fuels, to 
liquid rather than solid fuels, to grid and other networked supplies, and to more locally 
appropriate - often small scale - energy sources and conversion technologies. 
Prospects will begin to diverge after the year 2020, however, with different energy industries 
embarked on often mutually exclusive development paths. Coal, despite its huge resource 
base, could be particularly threatened unless its use forms change markedly - due to increased 
competition from other energy sources and environmental constraints in response to sulphur 
dioxide, particulates, methane, carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide emissions. This could 
prove especially important for some coal-rich developing countries. By contrast the oil 
industry, and the natural gas industry to an even greater extent, have a long future ahead 
provided today's strong exploration and resource development effort continues. The full 
report gives more detail on different production profiles in the six scenarios including 
international energy trade and export revenues. 
New markets will have to be developed for the traditional fuels, recognising that the shift 
from selling primary energy to marketing energy services will continue and intensify. The 
traditional fuels will also experience intensifying competition from a widening range of 
renewable energy sources for electricity generation, from other sources of heat and power 
(anaerobic digesters and photovoltaics, for example), and for motor vehicle propulsion 
(methanol, for instance). 
The demand for convenient, flexible, clean and efficient energy services by consumers will 
be a powerful force for greater consumer-orientation and dialogue between energy suppliers 
and consumers. Energy companies will increasingly be expected to provide services, and 
perhaps widening packages of related services. It is possible that specialised suppliers of 
fossil fuels - with particular competitive advantages in exploration, production and 
transportation - may still be able to treat the fossil fuel they deal in as a commodity. Most 
of the pressure is likely to be in the opposite direction, especially where vertical integration 
exists and companies diversify as a strategic response to perceived threats or expanding 
opportunities in growth markets. Structural changes can clearly be anticipated over the next 
century. Although the energy industry has many long established companies, this is the 
exception across industry and commerce generally. The greater the service orientation the 
more scope there is for change as efforts are made to maintain and increase competitive 
advantage, and the scope for new entrants increases. 
Deregulation and privatisation - which have recently occurred in a number of countries and 
in different ways are being watched closely by many others - can also be expected to change 
strategies and operating goals. Deregulation and privatisation will usually enhance service 
orientation and the satisfaction of short-term operating goals such as efficiency, profitability 
and shareholder returns. Deregulation and privatisation may well not enhance long-term 
strategic thinking, research and development for longer term advantage, or diversification in 
the absence of anticipated short-term gains. The corporate focus may therefore become more 
short-term in ways that do not lend themselves naturally to the taking up of some of the long- 
term strategic options which this study would suggest are desirable - and probably inevitable 
in most scenarios. In this situation new entrants are likely to fill the gap, but these may not 
have the initial capital or the history of relevant learning and experimentation which would 
allow relatively rapid process. 
2.2.2 Technology Innovation and Diffusion Play a Key Role 
New energy technologies on the supply side and for energy-using devices are expected to lie 
at the heart of efficiency improvements, cost reductions, and better services provided by 
energy. The present study drew on IIASA's data bank of 1,400 technologies covering the 
whole energy system. However, energy options that are not technically feasible today were 
excluded (while technically feasible options which are not yet commercially feasible, were 
included). 
In high economic growth scenarios where relatively large quantities of fuels will be required 
there need to be considerable advances in hydrocarbon exploration and extraction, renewable 
and nuclear electricity generation, hydrogen and bio-fuel production and conversion, and more 
efficient appliances. In ecologically driven scenarios low-carbon fossil and renewable 
technologies are favoured, together with greater emphasis on end-use efficiency. There is 
likely to be an increasing number of situations where end-of-pipe technology approaches are 
not the most appropriate solution. For efficiency and environmental reasons a new or 
alternative total systems approach is likely to yield the best results. Moreover, it may result 
in greater competitive advantage. 
This study's scenarios clearly indicate the need for an adequately high level of research, 
development and demonstration expenditures. The ecologically driven scenarios, with their 
emphasis on renewable energy and efficiency, especially require a shift of R&D flows, more 
innovation, faster diffusion, and greater capital intensity in future. However, there is a high 
rate of technology learning and improvement which tends to reduce capital costs. 
Currently R&D expenditures are generally lagging perceived requirements, especially for 
raising energy efficiency and environmental mitigation. Yet technology innovation and 
diffusion is a cumulative experience of learning and experimentation which takes time, and 
which cannot normally be greatly accelerated by policy interventions. More needs to be spent 
on R&D, by companies and governments alike. Joint government/corporate research is likely 
to increase, for mutual and greater societal benefit. There have, for example, been great 
benefits in recent years arising form the enhanced recovery and tangential drilling techniques 
of the international oil industry. There is considerable scope for cleaner coal conversion and 
use, for reducing local pollution from oil use, and for accelerating renewable energy 
provision. 
2.2.3 Costly Investments - Financing Is Problematic 
The expected changes which have been listed so far suggest that they cannot be achieved 
except with large financial investments. This study estimated that cumulative investments in 
energy supply projects between 1990 and 2020, in the various scenarios, would range between 
U.S.$ (1990) 13 and 20 trillion (1012) for the world. Between 2020 and 2050 the range is 
U.S.$ (1990) 18 and 34 trillion. 
These estimates include capital for production capacity, for transmission and distribution 
infrastructures, and for complying with environmental standards. As a share of projected 
GDP globally, and by region, they are modest except for the economies in transition (where 
they represent 7%-9% of GDP 1990-2020). The study also concludes that its estimated 
capital requirements for energy supply projects are manageable in relation to current savings 
rates (globally about 22% of GDP - 21% in industrialised countries and 24% in developing 
countries), and in relation to capital markets (which have been growing faster than GDP and 
are expected to continue to do so). But these simple comparisons may encourage unwarranted 
complacency. 
For many supply-side investments the real challenge is likely to be not the scale of financing 
required but the uncertainties of risks and rates of return. Returns in the energy sector have 
long been low in relation to infrastructural investments in urban development and transport. 
Rates of return considerations discriminate against most smaller-scale, clean and innovative 
energy supplies, and against investments in energy efficiency improvements. Market size and 
product mobility often favour investments in oil exploration over, for instance, energy 
conservation. International funding has also tended historically to favour large schemes 
backed by local government even when front-end costs are high and substantial external 
indebtedness is incurred. 
Two developments in recent years are expected to change this situation in some important 
respects. First, privatisation and deregulation has been a response in part to heavy debt burdens 
built up by the publicly-owned energy sector which has existed in many countries in the past. 
Secondly, stagnation in international development finance and the view in international funding 
agencies that their share of energy sector financing will decline. Both developments indicate 
that energy financing must therefore come increasingly from the private sector and local 
sources. In many countries this will require new or modified institutions to mobilise local 
finance, and the adaptation of local energy industries to provide acceptable and secure returns. 
Privatisation and deregulation are also likely to make it easier for governments to countenance 
the reduction/elimination of subsidies, and setting energy prices to reflect real costs. Such 
steps together with the maintenance of a stable political climate, in order to reduce investment 
risks and broaden access to international capital markets, are essential if private financing of 
energy investments is to be maxirnised. However, it is clear that the energy sector will have 
to compete with other sectors for investment financing - and that some of those sectors, as 
indicated earlier, have a history of offering substantially higher returns. 
There is also the challenge posed by the fact that these estimates do not include investments 
in end-use technologies such as furnaces, appliances and vehicles, as these traditionally count 
as durable consumer goods or business investments. The fact that the performance of end-use 
technologies plays such an important role in all this study's scenarios is a strong argument 
in favour of new approaches to evaluating energy sector investments. Integrated resource 
planning has begun to extend the traditional energy sector perspective to take into account 
investments in end-use technologies. Approaches that assess together both supply options and 
end-use options, both expansion and conservation, will be increasingly important. 
2.3 Environmental Pressures 
2.3.1 Local and Regional Pollution Remains a High Priority 
The WEC Commission "Energy for Tomorrow's World", 1993 found that local and regional 
issues were ranked higher than potential climate change by eight of the nine world regions 
surveyed. The exception was Western Europe, which concluded that potential climate change 
was important. All regions considered local and regional pollution important. Both this study 
and another recent WEC report: "Local and Regional Related Environmental Issues", 1995 
emphasise the importance of local and regional pollution. 
Two categories of pollution are highlighted. First, that arising from poverty: poor sanitation; 
polluted water; high levels of indoor air pollution caused by burning traditional fuels - 
impacting with particular severity on women, children and the elderly; and high 
concentrations of particulate matter in urban areas. Secondly, pollution of modern origins: 
resulting particularly from dense motorised traffic and from low-efficiency coal combustion 
in electricity generating plants, industrial premises and homes. Concentrations of suspended 
particulate matter, lead, volatile organic components, tropospheric ozone, and sulphur dioxide 
widely exceed World Health Organisation guidelines. 
Four conclusions are reached: 
improving conversion efficiencies in end-use devices has a key role to play in 
conserving traditional resources such as fuelwood and reducing indoor air 
pollution; 
structural shifts away from many traditional energy end-use patterns and energy- 
carriers towards more efficient modern conversion technologies and cleaner 
energy carriers are urgently necessary; 
there is a need for a long-term shift towards energy services provided through 
clean, grid-dependent fuels; 
increasingly, local solutions to local problems would come forward that are 
appropriate in nature and scale to local circumstances, and may include locally 
appropriate renewable energy provision as well as end-use devices. 
Widening education, health and welfare awareness, and social and economic development will 
be accompanied by increasing dissatisfaction with avoidable local pollution and greater means 
to tackle it. Pollution of a more regional nature, through energy-related emissions of sulphur 
dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NO,), have also been examined in this study. Acid 
deposition is of particular concern. 
The RAINS model developed at IIASA was used to calculate unabated scenarios of sulphur 
deposition in Europe and in South and East Asia. It became clear that unless scrubbers and 
other mitigating technologies are used in coal-fired generating plants then any coal-intensive 
scenario will have unacceptably high sulphur emissions. In Europe over the next 30 years 
sulphur emissions would increase by about 50% leading to sulphur deposition in excess of 
16g.~/m2 per year over large areas of Central, Western and Northern Europe. This level 
exceeds the maximum laid down in the Second Sulphur Protocol of the European Community 
on Transboundary Air Pollution by more than 5-fold. 
In the rapidly growing economies of Asia the challenge of coal-intensive scenarios is even 
greater. Sulphur emissions in South and East Asia could more than double by 2020 in the 
absence of effective abatement measures. Current national energy projections in the region 
actually exceed this level. Plans exist in China to triple coal use over the period to 2050, to 
3.6 billion tonnes per annum (a quantity which is 10% higher than today's total global coal 
use). Unless scrubbers are fitted to virtually all new coal-fired plants air quality in South and 
East Asia will deteriorate significantly in both urban and rural areas. In the absence of 
abatement measures sulphur depositions could readily reach double the worst levels ever 
observed in the most polluted areas of Central and Eastern Europe. The model assessment 
reported in "Global Energy Perspectives to 2050 and Beyond" shows depositions would 
exceed "critical loads" for most of the ecosystems in Asia, and for economically important 
food crops by factors up to 10. 
For this reason the six scenarios developed for this study 4 incorporate advanced coal 
technology, including scrubbers for new electricity generation capacity. Sulphur emissions 
are therefore lower in all scenarios than they would be without abatement - in fact 50% or 
less than implied by unabated scenarios. Sulphur abatement nevertheless imposes significant 
costs. With much greater investment it would be possible to reduce sulphur emissions further 
than has been assumed in this study, but the investment assumptions made are already 
challenging for developing and rapidly industrialising countries which may not attach high 
priority to getting depositions significantly below critical loads. 
The prospect of a massive rise in road vehicle use, particularly in South and East Asia, along 
with heavy reliance on oil to meet most of this demand for several decades to come, also 
indicates that nitrogen emissions and other precursors of tropospheric ozone (smog) will be 
accorded high priority. 
Environmental concerns of a local nature are also likely to rise from a different quarter; some 
renewable energy sources. Large hydro schemes have aroused increasing concern in recent 
years due to the population displacement, inundation of good agricultural land and loss of 
natural habitats they cause. This is why the present study has inter alia moderated the estimates 
of medium-term hydro development from earlier WEC studies, despite the relatively high 
conversion efficiencies (within the renewables sector) that the more effective schemes achieve. 
Of even greater potential concern is large plantation biomass, if the prospect is that land areas 
of 1,350 million hectares or more may be involved. This would impose exceptional 
challenges for biodiversity, natural habitats and species protection, and visual amenity. Other, 
though probably less serious, local environmental threats may arise from renewable energy 
I 
development. Increasing environmental awareness and desire to achieve balanced 
development will influence the pace and nature of renewable energy expansion, particularly 
in more prosperous countries with choices. 
2.3.2 Greenhouse Gas E~nissions Vury Widely 
Using standard medium world population projections (as in this study), and assuming no 
dramatic shifts in the fuel mix to meet rising energy demand, a number of models have 
calculated future greenhouse gas emissions and their atmospheric concentration. Carbon 
dioxide (CO,) is the greenhouse gas which has been looked at particularly closely in the 
context of energy provision and use, and potential climate change. 
The work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which produced a number of 
emissions scenarios in 1992 (the IS92 Series IS92a-f), suggested that on comparable 
assumptions atmospheric C 0 2  concentrations could rise 4 to 6-times from their current levels 
by the year 2100. The present study suggests at first sight that the range of possibilities is 
much wider. In a high economic growth and coal-intensive scenario atmospheric CO, 
concentrations could rise nearly 5-fold from their current level by 2100. On the other hand, 
if ecologically driven scenarios were pursued then atmospheric C 0 2  concentrations might only 
rise some 65% from their current level. 
In fact this study compares the emissions which emerge in six scenarios that have different, 
but internally consistent, assumptions about techno-economic development and policy measures. 
Once such internal consistency is taken into account, by contrast to the widely varying 
assumptions of the IPCC scenarios, the emissions in the present study are essentially lower 
and mitigation becomes an integral part of the whole "minimum regret" development strategy. 
The atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases is believed to be the key factor in global 
mean surface temperature change, and hence climate. If the rise in atmospheric CO, 
concentration (currently approaching 358 parts per million by volume - ppmv) were to be 
contained at 580 ppmv or 590 ppmv by the year 2100 (the outcome of this study's two 
ecologically driven scenarios) then the implications are important. First, current climate 
models suggest that mean global surface temperature is likely to rise by less than lS°C  over 
the period of a century. This would have some impacts on food production, precipitation, and 
human settlements, but of a modest order. Secondly, mean sea level rise would be modest 
(perhaps of the order of 25 cms above 1990 levels) and with geographically restricted 
impacts. Thirdly, given the great deal of uncertainty surrounding the subject of future climate 
change and its impacts, pursuit of ecologically driven scenarios would provide some 
confidence that significant climate change arising from human activities could be avoided. 
There are two further implications of this study that are important: 
the scope for improving energy efficiency, bringing on cost-effective non-fossil 
energy supplies, and mitigating local and regional pollution is so enormous that 
effective action in these three areas will have substantial all round benefits; 
the world has options for change, and for avoiding catastrophic or unattractive 
outcomes. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change assumed for its 1992 
emissions scenarios that few policy changes were made. This study has indicated 
the options, and the wide variety of possible outcomes if sound and effective 
policy decisions are made. Policies, if they are to be instituted rapidly and 
effectively, should aim at meeting both the high concern with local pollution and 
the curbing of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, which are not widely 
regarded with the same urgency or seriousness. 
2.4 Social, Institutional and Geopolitical Implications 
2.4.1 The Significance of Population Growth 
This study has taken a standard single medium population projection for the world. From its 
present level approaching 5.8 billion (lo9), world population is assumed to grow to 10.1 
billion by 2050 and to 11.7 billion by 2100. Over 90% of that growth will occur in the 
current developing countries. By 2100 Asia and Africa combined are expected to account for 
over 80% of the world's population and the current developing countries for about 80% of 
the world's primary energy use. In 1990 Asia and Africa combined accounted for 72% of 
the world's population, but the developing countries for only one-third of the world's primary 
energy use. Population growth in the current developing countries, and the social and 
economic development which occurs in these countries, will be the main force driving the 
demand for energy services upwards. 
2.4.2 The Importance of Urbanisation 
More than 80% of the population of industrialised countries lives in urban environments. The 
figures for developing countries cover a much wider range, but in some cases already reach 
or exceed the industrialised countries' average. Some 2.2 billion out of the world's 
population of 5.3 billion lived in urban areas in 1990. Over the period 1990-2025 (a mere 
35 years) the world's urban population is projected to increase to 5.2 billion. That increase 
of 3 billion accounts for nearly all the projected population growth (3.2 billion) in the period. 
According to the UN 60% of the world's population will live in urban areas by 2025, and if 
this trend continued some 75% of the world's population would live in urban areas by 2050. 
An increasing proportion are expected to live in "mega cities" of over 10 million inhabitants. 
These prospects pose severe challenges. Per capita energy consumption levels in urban areas 
are now much higher than country averages, partly reflecting high urban incomes. This 
pattern is not immutable. Heavy investments and the avoidance of chronic poverty and 
deprivation will be required. Energy transport and conversion infrastructures need to be put 
in place. The urban centres of many developing countries are already characterised by 
overcrowding; inadequate housing and health provision; poor air, water and land quality; 
and a range of energy-related local pollutants. These problems will be exacerbated by 
growing numbers of people, increased demand for energy services, and negative 
environmental impacts. This suggests that local and regional environmental problems will 
continue to be accorded high and urgent priority. They also indicate that imaginative 
thinking, measures and massive investments will be required in order to deal with these 
challenges, otherwise urban living conditions could deteriorate significantly. 
2.4.3 Offsetting the Pressures for Urbanisation? 
Although all the present study's scenarios portray the same broad trend towards increasing 
urbanisation, one scenario offers the prospects of this being conducted at a slower pace. In 
the event that rural energy requirements can be satisfied more quickly and at acceptably low 
costs by locally appropriate forms of decentralised, -mall-scale renewable sources of energy 
then this would simultaneously offer the opportunity of providing the energy services desired 
and slowing the pace of migration from the country to the city. 
Further along the development path other migratory forces may be at work - shifts to 
suburban areas from city centres, and eventually back to rural areas - but with employment 
and much economic dependence upon the city. These shifts in turn have their implications 
for the level and pattern of final energy demand. 
2.4.4 Sigrzificant Recent Developments 
Several recent developments of longer term significance have occurred since 1990. Two have 
already been mentioned. First, the stalling, and even reversal, of energy intensity reductions 
in OECD economies and the significant increase in energy intensities in transitional 
economies. Secondly, environmental developments including the 1987 Montreal Protocol on 
substances which deplete the stratospheric ozone layer and the Rio Earth Summit of June, 
1992 (of which Agenda 21 and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change - 
UNFCCC - formed a part). 
Since 1990 the economies in transition have experienced a massive fall in economic output 
- of the order of 40% by 1995. The developing countries of East Asia have seen the most 
impressive growth. The world economy has expanded at a sluggish pace of under 2% per 
annum. 
The World Trade Organization succeeded the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) in 1994, and there have been developments in regional bloc formation - the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mercosur (linking Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay 
and Uruguay with Chile and Bolivia in process of joining), and the enlargement of the 
European Union. 
The global demand for coal has been in decline since 1990, but the demand for natural gas 
and nuclear power have expanded markedly at the global level. 
All these developments have longer term implications. Among the most important is the 
moment when the economies in transition, and especially the Russian Federation, begin their 
economic recovery and improvement in energy intensities. The further out beyond the year 
2000 the turn-around is placed the more significant the impact on both the global and the 
regional assumptions for performance in the 1990-2020 period. Regional bloc formation 
carries with it the possibility of disruptive impacts on trade with third parties. Deliberation 
on potential climate change, demands for extended and intensified commitments, and greater 
focus on the impacts of fossil fuel provision and use are also likely to have significant long- 
term implications. 
There have been few signs so far that concern with environmental impacts of energy use at 
the local, regional or global levels is being translated into significant changes in patterns of 
energy end use and lifestyles. There remains the possibility that such real changes may occur 
in future. 
2.4.5 Institutional Changes in Prospect 
The various forces at work over the next few decades can be expected to create the need for 
both international and national institutional changes. Broad institutional and social issues 
were not directly addressed in this study, but a number of points are believed to be implied. 
Continuing dependence on fossil fuels, with in many countries rising import dependency and 
lengthening supply lines, will create the conditions for reinforcing international institutions 
and establishing new ones. The need for exploration and extraction of unconventional oil and 
natural gas resources may have similar consequences. 
The technological and financial needs of developing countries and transitional economies, 
especially the former with their rapidly rising populations and energy demands, are likely to 
promote the creation of international institutions geared to facilitating financial and technology 
transfers and cooperation. Similarly, the likely shift in the world's geopolitical balance from 
North to South can be anticipated to require the reinforcement of existing institutions (notably 
the UN and its agencies) or the creation of new institutions if the former are regarded as not 
up to their tasks. 
International disputes over trade in fossil fuels and over water resources (for hydro schemes) 
could also become more frequent and promote the creation of international institutions for 
mediation purposes. 
Regional and global environmental concerns are also likely to encourage the expansion or 
creation of relevant institutions. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 
series of Conferences of the Parties which have been instituted, as well as the Montreal 
Protocol and subsequent agreements on ozone depleting substances are a likely precursor of 
such arrangements. This Report assumes that if ecologically driven scenarios are to be 
achieved then an unprecedented level of international cooperation and agreement will be 
required focussed on environmental protection and enhancing international equity. This is 
more likely to come about as a result of strategic perception and power than of romantic 
ideals and the striking of attitudes. 
At the national level deregulation and privatisation are likely to proliferate, creating the need 
for new framework institutions to guide competition and pricing. Growing concerns with 
energy efficiency and environmental impacts of energy provision and use are likely to have 
similar consequences. There will need to be a careful balancing between the benefits of 
creating regulatory frameworks and the costs of bureaucratic intervention, where economic 
instruments are frequently better suited to the task in hand. With the increased attention paid 
to services, and consumer-orientation, the need for detailed regulation will become less 
obvious as the capacity for consumers to vote with their purses increases. 
2.4.6 The Coming Shift in the World's Geopolitical Balance 
Population growth, energy demand growth, and elements of catch-up in economic welfare and 
technology all point to major shifts in the world's geopolitical balance. For the key 
demographic and energy parameters it is clear that future growth will be concentrated in the 
current developing countries. 
This suggests that a major shift will occur in the world's geopolitical balance in favour of the 
developing world of "the South". This is likely to strengthen the South's ability to obtain and 
retain both internationally traded energy forms and access to technology. This anticipated 
shift in the geopolitical balance could find expression in many different ways. By 2050, if 
not long before, major countries now described as developing will no longer be so. They may 
also be moved to protect their own energy interests internationally, rather than relying upon 
the corporate, diplomatic or military strength of others to do so. 
In some of this study's scenarios per capita GDP by 2040 in the Pacific Asia region (even 
with the Pacific OECD member countries excluded) will have risen to the level reached in 
Western Europe in the early 1970s. For this and other reasons, within 50 years the distinction 
between developed and developing countries will have disappeared in many instances, and 
the power of collective consumption of energy may well have passed from the OECD 
countries to others. 
2.4.7 Options for Policy: What and When 
This study on "Global Energy Perspectives to 2050 and Beyond" developed six scenarios 
covering a wide range of future possibilities and yet there is little divergence between them 
up to the year 2020. Existing investments and patterns of activity, and long lead-times in 
developing alternative means of providing and using energy, are the essential reasons for this 
apparent commonality. 
Time is required for capital stock turnover and fundamental changes in the energy system. 
New energy resources and technologies have to be brought into being and widely diffused. 
New energy-using devices have to brought into use - power plants, motor vehicles, industrial 
processes, space heating and cooling systems, and lighting systems are of particular 
importance here. There is the likelihood of a shift towards a total systems approach from the 
traditional energy sector orientation, which becomes service-driven and consumer-oriented. 
There will be a need for new institutional capabilities - for financing, for facilitating 
technology innovation and diffusion, for new forms of cooperation and agreements, for new 
and more effective frameworks to achieve change. 
However, this study's six scenarios also demonstrated increasing divergence post-2020, 
especially on the energy supply side. That longer term divergence, however, is critically 
dependent upon research conducted, decisions made and investments started long before 2020. 
Infrastructural investments, production investments, and electricity generating plants are 
anticipated to have life-times of decades. The main potential energy development paths are 
mutually exclusive to a large degree. Unless the appropriate decisions are taken within the 
next 25 years, there will be foreclosure on some of the key post-2020 options. This is 
possibly the key factor which has emerged from this study to date, and creates a considerable 
onus on governments to understand and react to this situation. 
Among the appropriate decisions for a more sustainable future are increased and effective 
expenditure on research, development and demonstration of new renewable energy 
technologies and energy-using devices generally. Fossil fuel conversion and use should be 
made cleaner to support further deployment. Nuclear power provision needs to attract more 
widespread public confidence and support. Policies which promote energy efficiency, and 
encourage conservation on a cost-effective basis, and which price energy to cover costs in 
their broadest sense, must be planned and instituted rapidly. 
Perhaps above all, in those developing and rapidly industrialising countries where the future 
growth in energy demand will mostly take place, it is desirable that adequate and sustainable 
energy policies and investments are instituted without delay. Simultaneously, the advanced 
industrial countries should re-examine their high levels of energy consumption, and through 
efficiency improvement and conservation efforts reduce them. In the economies in transition, 
a major overhaul of existing capital stock, appliances, metering and pricing systems will be 
required. In some of the latter countries gas and oil export availability should improve and, 
although market systems appear slow to develop, they will ultimately do so. 
These options offer exciting prospects and business opportunities to those that seize them, 
whether in the traditional commercial fuels or in the new energy forms that will become 
increasingly available. They will also offer both challenges and opportunities in energy 
markets that are increasingly service-driven and consumer-oriented. 
The single most important conclusion is that given the expected divergence of 
development paths post-2020, and the foreclosure of potentially desirable options unless 
relevant policies are initiated and decisions taken long before then, action needs to start 
now. 
TECHNICAL ANNEX 
The full WECAIASA "Global Energy Perspectives to 2050 and Beyond" Report is 100-pages 
in length, contains many colour graphics, and is organized into seven chapters. Chapter 1, 
the introduction, briefly presents the structure of the study, and its scenario-based approach. 
Chapter 2 lays out the six scenarios developed, and, in particular, how they were put together 
purposely to cover a broad range of possible futures. 
All six scenarios start from the base year 1990 and the historical trends leading up to that 
year. Chapter 3 presents the basic interpretation of past data that underlies the extensions of 
historical tendencies into alternative future perspectives. It also summarizes key developments 
that have taken place since the base year, 1990. 
Chapter 4 looks at the determinants of future energy use, and describes how they vary across 
the six scenarios, and Chapter 5 presents, using many illustrations, the essential quantitative 
characteristics of all six scenarios. It describes how they differ in their primary energy 
structures, resource use, and electricity sectors, and how similar they are in their final energy 
structures. 
Chapter 6 turns to implications on a number of fronts: investments and financing, 
international trade, the constraints and opportunities facing different energy industries - coal, 
oil, gas, renewables, and nuclear - and environmental impacts, at the local, regional, and 
global level. Chapter 7 presents the conclusions. 
The six scenarios developed were clustered around: 
A - High Economic Growth (Scenarios Al, A2 and A3). 
B - Middle Course (Scenario B). 
C - Ecologically Driven (Scenarios C1 and C2). 
The internal consistency of the scenarios has been tested by the use of formal IIASA models. 
There is a close and intentional link between A, B and C and the three Cases of the WEC 
Commission: "Energy for Tomorrow's World", 1993. The Commission's Cases were: A 
(High Growth); B (Reference - with B, as a Modified Reference Case to 2020); and C 
(Ecologically Driven). This study's scenarios can be broadly described as follows: 
The High Economic Growth framework for the three A scenarios is characterized by 
enormous productivity increases and wealth. It is technology and resources intensive and 
presumes favourable geopolitics and free markets. High growth facilitates a more rapid 
turnover of capital stock and changes in economic structure, both of which spur efficiency 
improvements and technological progress. If A is extended all the way to 2100, global 
average per capita income surpasses even the highest levels observed today and current 
distinctions between "developed" and "developing" regions become obsolete. 
A includes three scenarios addressing alternative key developments in energy supply. In the 
A1 scenario, there is ample future availability of oil and gas resources. At the other end of 
the spectrum, the A2 scenario assumes oil and gas resources fail to be recovered in sufficient 
quantities for technical, economic and political reasons - resulting in a massive return to coal. 
Finally, in the A3 scenario rapid technological change in nuclear and renewable energy 
technologies results in a phaseout of fossil fuels for economic reasons rather than due to 
resource scarcity. This unfolding into three different development trajectories results in three 
scenarios with almost identical energy end-use patterns but different energy system structures. 
The single Middle Course scenario B is based on a more cautious approach regarding 
economic growth prospects, rates of technological change, and energy availability. In short, 
the scenario is perhaps best characterized by "muddling through" and derives its appeal 
primarily because it is "pragmatic". Overall, this scenario is "reachable" without relying on 
drastic changes in current institutions, technologies, or current perception of availability of 
fossil fuel resources. 
The more modest energy use compared with the A scenarios implies that scenario B can rely 
on fossil fuel resources to an extent that is commensurate with current estimates of ultimately 
recoverable oil and gas reserves. Energy supply and end-use patterns are also closer to the 
current situation for a longer period in B than in A and C. 
Beyond 2020, however, the depletion of fossil resources without counterbalancing 
technological progress will force more dramatic changes in energy supply structures. 
Nonetheless, a transition away from fossil fuel use is feasible and manageable. In the very 
long-term, the changes become much more dramatic, and an orderly transition away from 
fossil fuel use is not only feasible but appears to be manageable in terms of energy sector and 
institutional adjustments extending towards the end of the 21st century. 
The Ecologically Driven framework for the two C scenarios presents challenging global 
perspectives. It is optimistic about technology and geopolitics, but it also assumes 
unprecedented international cooperation focused explicitly on environmental protection and 
international equity. It builds on substantial resource transfers from North to South, spurring 
growth in the South that will lead to a significant reduction in present economic disparities. 
In addition to stringent control of local and regional pollutants, a global regime to control the 
emissions of greenhouse gases is established. The goal is to reduce C 0 2  emission levels to 
2GtC by 2100, (corresponding to one-third of 1990 levels required to stabilize atmospheric 
concentrations). Ambitious policy measures accelerate energy efficiency improvements and 
develop and promote environmentally benign, decentralized energy technologies. One policy 
option considered for achieving this goal is a carbon tax that gradually increases to U S 4 0 0  
per tC in 2100. 
The C1 and C2 scenarios describe a transition away from the current dominance of fossil 
fuels towards a dominance of renewable energy flows. The quality of the energy carriers 
delivered to end users is high in order to meet the environmental constraints so that renewable 
energy sources are transformed into electricity, liquid, and gaseous energy carriers. Nuclear 
energy is at a crossroads and this constitutes the main difference between scenarios C1 and 
C2. 
Table A I provides the main features of the scenarios. 
Table A I 
A Summary of the Scenarios in 2050 and 2100 
Population i n  lo9 
in  2050 
in  2100 
GWP i n  1012$ 
in 2050 
in  2100 
Energy Productivity Growth 
PEIGDP, %lyr 
World (1 990-2050) 
World (1 990-21 00) 
medium low high 
Primary Energy Demand, Gtoe 
in  2050 




























C02  Targets 
Carbon Emission, GtC 
in  2050 
in 2100 
Environmental Taxes 
Table A I1 sets out the main world economic and energy characteristics of the six scenarios in  1990, 2020 and 
2050. 
Table A I1 
World 
199 2020 2050 
A1 A2 A3 B C1 C2 Al A2 A3 B C1 C2 
Population, billion 5.3 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 10.1 10.1 10.1 10.1 10.1 10.1 
GDPppp,US(1990)$, 25.7 60.6 60.6 60.6 53.0 54.1 54.1 121.3 121.3 121.3 92.9 95.9 95.9 
GDP ,, US(1990)$, 20.9 46.9 46.9 46.9 40.2 40.5 40.5 101.5 101.5 101.5 72.8 75.0 75.0 
Agriculture 1.4 3.2 3.2 3.2 2.9 3.0 3.0 5.3 5.3 5.3 4.5 4.8 4.8 
Industry 7.0 16.5 16.5 16.5 14.2 15.0 15.0 34.6 34.6 34.6 25.3 28.2 28.2 
Services 12.5 27.3 27.3 27.3 23.2 22.4 22.4 61.7 61.7 61.7 42.9 42.0 42.0 
Final energy, Gtoe 6.4 11.4 11.4 11.3 10.1 8.5 8.5 17.0 17.5 17.2 14.2 10.0 9.9 
Solids 1.9 2.6 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.7 3.3 3.1 3.2 2.0 2.0 
Liquids 2.5 4.4 4.3 4.1 3.5 2.8 2.8 7.2 6.3 5.6 4.7 3.4 3.4 
Electricity 0.8 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.2 2.9 3.1 3.0 2.3 1.8 1.7 
Otheru 1.2 2.7 2.6 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.2 4.3 4.7 5.4 3.9 2.9 2.8 
Primaryenergy,Gtoe 9.0 15.4 15.4 15.4 13.6 11.4 11.4 24.8 24.8 24.6 19.8 14.2 14.2 
Coal 2.2 3.7 4.3 2.9 3.4 2.3 2.3 3.8 7.8 2.2 4.1 1.5 1.5 
Oi 1 3.1 4.7 4.5 4.3 3.8 3.0 3.0 7.9 4.8 4.3 4.0 2.7 2.6 
Gas 1.7 3.6 3.4 3.8 3.2 3.1 3.0 4.7 5.5 7.9 4.5 3.9 3.3 
Nuclear 0.5 0.9 0.6 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.8 2.9 1.1 2.8 2.7 0.5 1.8 
Renewables 1.6 2.5 2.6 3.3 2.3 2.4 2.3 5.5 5.7 7.3 4.4 5.6 5.0 
Carbon emissions, 6.0 9.5 10.0 8.2 8.4 6.3 6.3 11.7 15.1 9.2 10.0 5.4 5.0 
Note: Subtotals may not add up due to independent rounding. 
District heat, gas, and hydrogen. 
For 2020 and 2050, emissions exclude non-energy uses (feedstocks). 
Table A 111 gives the energy resource estimates which underpin the study. 
Table A 111 
Estimates of Energy Reserves, Resources and Occurrences 
Global Fossil and Nuclear Energy Reserves, Resources, and Occurrences in Gtoe 
Consumption Resource Additional 









Coal 125 2.2 606 2,794 3,400 3,000 
Total 256 7.0 1,282 3,812 5,090 24,000 
Uranium 17 0.5 57 203 260 150 
in FBRs - - 3,390 12,150 15,550 8,900 
The study used significantly different energy intensity assumptions from those adopted in the WEC Commission 
Report: "Energy for Tomorrow's World", 1993. 
Table A IV provides the differences. 
Table A IV 
Energy Intensity Improvements Assumed (% per Annum) 
A B C B1 - C' 
OECD 1.2 1.1 2.0 1.9-2.8' 
DCs 1.6 1.2 1.9 0.8-2.1' 
World 1 .O 0.8 1.4 1.3-2.4' 
' Range of WEC Commission's Report on Energyfor Tomorrow's World. Improvement rates not directly comparable as based on PPP. 
I t  should be emphasized that the WEC Commission specifically rejected adoption of any  "business-as-usual" cases, and noted that in recent 
years groups of industrialized countries have achieved overall energy intensity reductions exceeding 1.5 percent per year (e.g., the European 
Union since 1974) and exceeding 2.5 percent per year if road transportation were excluded. Rut what can be achieved by a few countries 
over a relatively short period, and what can be achieved by many over a long period, may be two very different things. 
CIS Republics, Central & Eastern Europe, with economies in transition. 
The present study has reviewed the cumulative energy supply investments of the various scenarios. Table A 
V provides the results. 
Table A V 
Cumulative Investments in Energy Supply by Region 1990-2020 and 2020-2050 
A B C 
Energy Investments 1990-2020 2020-2050 1990-2020 2020-2050 1990-2020 2020-2050 
Cumulative 
in Trillion US$ 
( 1990) 
OECD 8 10 7 10 5 4 
REFsa 3 6 2 5 2 3 
DCs 9 18 7 15 6 11 
World 20 34 16 30 13 18 













" CIS Republics, Central & Eastern Europe, with economies in transition. 
A5 
The study produces data on various emissions including those of greenhouse gases. Table A VI provides a 
comparison of cumulative carbon emissions from fossil fuel use under various scenarios. It should be noted that 
the present study was a climate model updated since i t  was used for the WEC Commission report, the result of 
which would be to reduce somewhat the WEC Commission figures quoted here. 
Table A VI 
Cumulative Emissions 1990-2100 (GtC): IPCCf and WEC Scenarios Compared* 
IPCClIS92 emissions scenarios 
IS92 a (a "medium" case) 1,500 
IS92 b (more environmental compliance) 1,430 
IS92 e (faster economic growth) 2,190 
WEC Cases: 
"Energy for Tomorrow's World, 1993 
High Growth A 1,425 
Reference B 1,130 
Ecologically Driven C 625 
WECIIIASA 1995 Scenarios 
"Global Energy Perspectives to 2050 and 
Beyond" 
High Growth A2 1,720 
High Growth A 1 1,350 
High Growth A3 980 
Middle Course B 1,190 
Ecologically Driven C 1 590 
Ecologically Driven C2 580 
* On comparable world population assumption ( U N  medium projection) 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
Readers are recommended to the full report for much further detail and an academic treatment of the various 
issues covered. 
